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NOTES
GETTING INSIDE THE JURY'S HEAD: MEDIA
ACCESS TO JURORS AFTER THE TRIAL
This Court has not yet decided that the fair
administration of criminal justice must be
subordinated to another safeguard of our
constitutional system-freedom of the press, properly
conceived. [This] Court has not yet decided that,
while convictions must be reversed and miscarriages
of justice result because the minds of jurors or
potential jurors [grew] poisoned, the poisoner is
constitutionally protected in plying his trade.'
I. Introduction
On August 22, 1993, in the case of United States v. Antar,2
United States District Judge Nicholas H. Politan issued an order
placing a seal on the names and addresses of jurors.' Judge Politan
effectively barred the press from interviewing any of the jurors in the
case, even after the verdict.' The highly publicized case involved
$80 million in stock fraud and the pursuit of the defendant across
three continents.' The case was further marked with particularly
controversial and bizarre messages coming from the jury during their
deliberations, including mention of a juror acting loudly and
offensively.'
'Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 730 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2 839 F. Supp. 293 (D.N.J. 1993).






312 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. [Vol. XII
Judge Politan, recognizing that post-verdict interviews create
"collision within the whole jury system,"7 declared that "the press
would have an uphill battle to demonstrate what news gathering
interests are sufficient 'to overcome the very sacred nature of [the]
jury's deliberations.'" 8 The judge was adamant about his ruling:
This sensationalism has got to stop someplace. We
have to get back to our system of justice .. . .I am
an avid advocate of First Amendment rights and
freedom of the press, and all sorts of things like
that . . . .But we've got to get our system of justice
squared away. There is something radically wrong if
we're trying cases in the press ....
While Judge Politan eventually ordered the transcript of the
jury voir dire unsealed,"0 the original order issued by Judge Politan
brings into focus the conflicts that exist in highly publicized criminal
trials. These conflicts include: (1) the First Amendment right of the
news media to gather and disseminate information;" (2) the accused's
right to a fair trial under the Sixth Amendment;12 (3) the privacy
Id. (quoting remarks of Judge Politan while issuing his order).
8 Rudolph, supra note 3, at 6 (quoting Judge Politan).
SId. Judge Politan further intimated that "everything we do in this system of justice
is designed to protect the secrecy of the jury proceedings." Robert Rudolph, Antar Trial
Judge Defends Jury Interview Ban, STAR-LEDGER, Aug. 24, 1993, at 16 (quoting
comments of Judge Politan during a different proceeding in the case).
" Antar, 839 F. Supp. at 295. For a discussion of the order and the parameters
thereof, see infra text accompanying notes 254-59.
" The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
12 The Sixth. Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed .... . .U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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rights of citizens serving as jurors;" (4)' the: traditional
common law notions of a public trial;1 4 and (5) the traditional secrecy
of jury deliberations."
This Note will examine the relevant case law at the federal
and state levels and will suggest a possible compromise between these
competing interests beyond those which have already been
promulgated. First, the conflicts and competing interests of post-
verdict juror interviews are identified and explained. Next, the
relevant case law is examined at both the federal and state level.
Finally, several compromises are advocated.
I. Arguments and Conflicts
There are well-settled, sound arguments for the right of access
of the press to interview jurors about their perceptions and
experiences during their service. Initially, it is important for citizens
to know how their government operates to dispose of controversies.' 6
'3 See, e.g., United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983)
(stating that "Ulurors, even after completing their service, are entitled to privacy"); see
also United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202, 1210 n.12 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that
the judge was "following a well-established practice when he refused to publicly release
the jury list . . . .Such protection of the privacy of the jurors was clearly permissible,
and certainly appropriate in a trial which attracted public attention . ); infra text
accompanying notes 82-96.
t4 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 569 (1980)
(concluding that "[c]riminal trials both here and in England [have] long been
presumptively open").
S5 ee Note, Public Disclosures of Jury Deliberations, 96 HARv. L. REv. 886, 886
(1983) [hereinafter Public Disclosures].
16 This is to "vindicate the concerns of the victims and the community in knowing
that offenders are being brought to account for their criminal conduct by jurors fairly
and openly selected." Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509
(1984). These concerns are vindicated in this way because "it is difficult for [citizens]
to accept what they are prohibited from observing." Id. Also, "[b]ecause citizens
cannot attend criminal trials on a regular basis, and because only a few citizens serve as
jurors in any given case, the public relies instead on members of the media to serve as
independent auditors of the justice system." Marc 0. Litt, "Citizen-Soldiers" or
Anonymous Justice: Reconciling the Sixth Amendment Right of the Accused, the First
Amendment Right of the Media and the Privacy Right of Jurors, 25 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 371, 372 (1992).
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The judiciary is no less subject to public scrutiny than any other
branch of government17 and it is a prerequisite for a fair and
democratic society that its citizenry be informed about how its elected
government functions.18 The public's knowledge of judicial process
helps to maintain the legitimacy of that branch of government.' 9
Without public scrutiny and input, the judicial branch tends to lose
this legitimacy. 2"
Based on these arguments, advocates for the free access of the
media argue for total disclosure of jurors' identities, and with it, the
17 See In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807, 809 (5th Cir. 1982) ("The public
has no less a right under the First Amendment to receive information about the operation
of the nation's courts than it has to know how other governmental agencies work.");
infra text accompanying notes 68-87.
IS See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) (citing Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (stating that the First Amendment is designed
to facilitate discussion in order to bring about "political and social changes desired by
the people")); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (stating that the First
Amendment is designed to maintain "free political discussion to the end that government
may be responsive to the will of the people"); see also Kathryn W. Hughes, Note,
Florida Star v. B.J.F.: Can the State Regulate the Press in the Interest of Protecting the
Privacy of Rape Victims?, 41 MERCER L. REV. 1061, 1065-66 (1990) (arguing that the
press serves the vital function of enlightening citizens by providing them with the
necessary material to make informed decisions concerning the operation of government).
I9 See Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 508 (arguing that "openness ... enhances both
the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to
public confidence in the system").
20 See Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1035 (1991) (plurality) ("The
judicial system, and in particular our criminal justice courts, play a vital part in a
democratic state, and the public has a legitimate interest in their operations."). "The
criminal justice system exists in a larger context of a government ultimately of the
people, who wish to be informed about happenings in the criminal justice system, and
if sufficiently informed about those happenings might wish to make changes in the
system." Id. at 1070 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Other arguments for openness in the
system have been stated in the following cases: Press-Enterprise, 464 U.S. at 508 (the
assurance of fair proceedings); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
556 (1980) (the discouragement of perjury); In re Globe Newspaper Co., 920 F.2d 88,
94 (1st Cir. 1990) (the discouragement of misconduct and biased decisions). The court
in In re Globe Newspaper Co. also argued for the instillation of confidence in judicial
proceedings through education regarding the methods of government and judicial
remedies. Id. (citing In re Reporters Commission for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d
1325, 1336-37 (D.C. Cir. 1985)), see also infra text accompanying notes 40-59.
1995] MEDIA ACCESS 315
possibility of juror interviews. 2' The disclosure of juror identities, it
is argued, assures the defendant and the public that the fate of the
accused is being decided by a fair and impartial jury.22
The accused's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial is
balanced against these arguments for free access of the media.23
There are many ways in which an unrestricted right of access to juror
identity may serve to inhibit a fair trial. Initially, the defendant is
entitled to be assured that jurors will not be thinking about public
opinion when they render a particularly controversial verdict.24 The
deliberation process has historically been shrouded in secrecy25 and
for good reason. It is necessary that the jury deliberate in absolute
candor, away from public scrutiny,26 in order to ensure fairness to the
defendant that the verdict will be decided solely on the evidence."
Some scholars have argued that if jurors are routinely examined by
the press in their functions as triers of fact, they will be less likely to
21 See United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1115 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1011 (1986) (appellant newspaper seeking permission to interview
discharged jurors "without restriction of any sort whatsoever"); see also infra notes 91-
106 and accompanying text.
22 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 569-70 (1980) (arguing that there is a
nexus between openness, fairness, and the perception of fairness and that openness
assures that the proceedings are conducted fairly).
23 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; see also United States v. Blanton, 719 F.2d 815,
817 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1099 (1984) (defendants contending that
inadequate measures in jury selection process to guard against prejudicial effect of
"massive adverse pretrial media publicity" denied them of their Sixth Amendment fair
trial right). In dissent, after deciding that none of the traditional Sixth Amendment
assurances existed at trial, Circuit Judge Engel declared: "We have no control over the
verdict of public opinion or the verdict of history. This case, however, concerns
something that is more important and fundamental-a man's liberty and his right to a fair
trial." Id. at 846 (Engel, J., dissenting).
24 See Allen Sharp, Postverdict Interviews with Jurors, CASE & COM., Sept.-Oct.
1983, at.3, 6 (arguing that the mere presence of observers during deliberations would
unfairly inhibit the deliberation process).
' See Public Disclosures, supra note 15, at 886.
26 Id. at 889-90. "Juror privacy is a prerequisite of free debate, without which the
decision making process would be crippled .... For the process to work according to
theory, the participants must feel completely free to dissect the credibility, motivations,
and just desserts of other people." Id.
' See Sharp, supra note 24, at 6.
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a verdict on the merits, and may in fact be swayed by public
opinion.2"
On the other hand, the personal'privacy of jurors must be
taken into consideration. 9 Too often, jurors are subjected to a crush
of media attention as they leave the courthouse after a highly
publicized trial.3  It is undisputed that there is great competition
within the media to get a story and sell papers.3 1 As a result, there
should be adequate mechanisms to protect jurors from overly
bothersome newspeople.3
Related to the right-of privacy is the concern for jurors'
personal security. 3  This problem becomes magnified in trials
Daniel Aaron, The First Amendment and Post-Verdict Interviews, 20 COLUM. J.
L. & Soc. PROBs. 203, 203-04 (1986) (discussing the media's effect on the jurors in the
trial of John Hinckley for the attempted assassination of U.S. President Ronald Reagan).
2 Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The right of personal privacy, that is, the right to be let alone has been called "the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." Id.
30 See Bennett H. Beach, The Juror as Celebrity; Does Postverdict Scrutiny Prevent
Abuses or Create Them?, TIME, Aug. 16, 1982, at 42 (observing that local papers will
often assign a team of four or five reporters to badger jurors in.the first days after a
trial); Bruce Fein, Jurors Have a Right To Be Let Alone, USATODAY, May 3,, 1990,
at 10A (arguing that jurors are "typically pummeled by reporters to break the secrecy
of the jury room [and] to betray the . . . reasoning of fellow jurors").
31 See Susan M. Bryan, Loving and Hating PR Peddlers, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Sept. 15,
1991, at F4 (arguing that "[i]n the news-and-entertainment-hungry world of the 1990's,
competition within the media to generate stories is fierce and furious"); Eleanor
Randolph, Coverage of Hiacking Raises Questions of Who's Exploiting Whom, WASH.
POST, June 23, 1985, at A20 (discussing critics' charges that "grueling competition" to
cover a story led to the invasion of privacy by the media of families dealing with
hijacking crisis).
32 See, e.g., United States v. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. 719, 726 (D. Mass. 1987)
(implementing waiting period before the media are allowed to interview jurors); see infra
text accompanying notes 61-70; see also United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133,
1145 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (prohibiting the media from interviewing jurors on the premises
of courthouse and declaring that any conduct by members of the media constituting
harassment would be "handled appropriately by the Court"); infra text accompanying
notes 120-36.
33 Concern over the personal security of jurors is not only based upon. consideration
of their safety as individuals, but is also based upon the Sixth Amendment implications.
See Eisler v. United States, 176 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 958
(1949). "Trial by jurors whose personal security will [be affected by-conviction or
acquittal] is not trial by an impartial jury and is not due process of law.," Id. at 25
(Edgerton, J., dissenting).
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involving organized crime where jury intimidation is not
uncommon.34 Of course, this concern is not limited to situations
where a jury might be reluctant to convict for fear of retaliation."'
It is equally applicable to situations where the public has already
convicted a defendant before trial.36 The jury should be free from the
pressures of popular opinion where a defendant has already been
4 See, e.g., United States v. Pasciuti, 803 F. Supp. 499 (D.N.H. 1992) (detailing
various methods of juror intimidation by the Hell's Angels, including a threat of
"problems" if a guilty verdict were returned); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121,
140-41 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907 (1980) (upholding use of anonymous
jury to protect jurors from fear of retaliation). In Barnes, the Second Circuit took note
of the indications of defendants' "willingness to interfere with thejudicial system." See
Eric Wertheim, Anonymous Juries, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 983 n.9 (1986).
" See Pasciuti, 803 F. Supp. at 502. This concern not only relates to situations
where jurors may be under a fear of retaliation after a conviction but also to situations
where they may be reluctant to acquit. See United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376 (2d
-Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960 (1965). In Borelli, the jury was urged, through
anonymous letters, to find the defendants guilty. Id. at 392. The court declared that
there are times when jurors' names must be held in confidence to "protect the integrity
of criminal trials against this kind of disruption, whether it emanated from defendants'
enemies, from their friends, or from neither." Id.,
3 See William Kastin, Note, Presumed Guilty: Trial by the Media-The Supreme
Court's Refsalto Protect Criminal Defendants in High Publicity Cases, 10 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HUM. RTs. 107, 110 (1992) (arguing that "the explosion of communications in the
electronic media . . . diminishes the possibility of selecting [an impartial juryl");
Newton N. Minow & Fred H. Cate, Who Is an Inpartial Juror in an Age of Mass
Media?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 631, 632 (1991) (arguing that "[plotential jurors may
arrive . . . on the first day of the trial with extensive knowledge about the victim, the
crime, and the defendant, including inaccurate or influential information which
may . . . never be introduced in court"). This is not by any means a new phenomenon,
created by a sophisticated electronic media. In 1807, when Aaron Burr was tried for
treason, the Supreme Court realized the danger of pretrial publicity and the effect it
might have on a court's ability to empanel an impartial jury. Joseph F. Flynn, Note,
Prejudicial Publicity in Criminal Trials: Bringing Sheppard v. Maxwell Into the
Nineties, 27 NEw ENG. L. REV. 857, 857 (1993). However, Chief Justice John
Marshall noted: "Were it possible to obtain a jury without any prepossessions whatever
respecting the guilt or innocence of the accused, it would be extremely desirable to
obtain such a jury; but this is perhaps impossible, and therefore will not be required."
Id. at 857 n.5 (quoting United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 49, 50-51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807)).
See generally Flynn, supra (arguing that the potential danger of pretrial publicity is
vastly multiplied in today's technological age, and discussing .instances involving
substantial pretrial publicity).
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
"tried and convicted in the press" and should be able to render a
verdict without fear of public scorn or harassment.
7
IlL. Compelling Interests, Narrowly Tailored Standards,
and Juror Privacy: The Federal Cases
While the Supreme Court has never held that the media have
an absolute right to gather and disseminate information, 8 it has long
been held that any infringements on their function are to be viewed
with suspicion. 9 With this in mind, the federal courts generally have
frowned upon absolute prohibition of media contact with jurors."
The following cases illustrate this point and are examples of how the
federal courts have dealt with limitations on post-verdict juror contact
by the media.
A. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Hurley41
In Globe, the defendants were charged in connection with an
alleged conspiracy to conceal illegal drug profits.42 The sensational
nature of the trial existed because the defendants included a
prominent Boston attorney, a reputed member of organized crime,
and a member of the Bahamian government.43
s See Public Disclosures, supra note 15, at 890 (stating that "juries may be
intimidated into rendering certain verdicts by the specter of subsequent pressures").
' The Supreme Court 1988 Term, Leading Cases-Freedom of Speech, Press, and
Association, 103 HARV. L. REV. 239, 246 (1989) (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 781 (1978); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988); Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19
(1966)).
'9 Id. (citing First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S. 'at 781); see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 681 (1972) (finding that "without some protection for seeking out the news,
freedom of the press could be eviscerated").
40 See, e.g., Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986)
(holding that court could not issue a "sweeping restraint" forbidding all contact between
the press and dismissed jurors absent a "compelling interest"); see infra text
accompanying notes 137-52.
41 920 F.2d 88 (1st Cir. 1990).
42 Id. at 90.
43 Id.
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After receiving the verdict, the trial judge issued this
statement upon dismissing the jurors:
Members of the jury, the press may call you. It is up
to you whether to speak with them. My suggestion is
this, though: These are very grave matters. You
have deliberated as a body, in confidence, and it is
best that the result of your deliberations should
remain in confidence.'
Although he advised the members of the jury that the press may
contact them, the judge made this almost impossible when he denied
access to the jurors' names and addresses after they expressed a
unanimous wish to remain anonymous.4" In issuing the order, the
judge noted:
The jurors in this case explicitly expressed a desire
that their names and addresses not be released to the
press. It is the judgment of the court that interviews
of jurors for the sole purpose of exploiting the content
of their deliberations, which have been conducted in
secret and in confidence with one another, tend to
demean the administration of justice in the public's
view and to inhibit jurors, present and prospective,
from voicing their strongly held views for fear of
subsequent public disclosure to the ultimate detriment
of the deliberative process.46
•The Globe moved to intervene. 47 The motion was denied, and the
paper applied for mandamus review to the First Circuit, which held
that the venire list had to be released.48 In directing the court to turn
over the names and addresses, the First Circuit reasoned that "[t]o
4Id.
4 See id.
6 Globe, 920 F.2d at 90 n. 1.
47 Id. at 90.
4 Id. at 98.
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justify impoundment after the trial has ended, the court must find a
significant threat to the judicial process itself."49
In discussing possible "significant threat[s] to the judicial
process," the court cited the personal safety considerations of
jurors.5" The court noted that if jurors were to fear for their safety,
they might be more likely to tailor their verdict to help ensure their
safety and may be less willing to serve in the future.51 However, in
ordering their names to be furnished to the press, the First Circuit
mentioned no other considerations as prominently as juror safety and
found that a democratic society would not tolerate verdicts from
anonymous juries."
In reviewing the decision of the trial judge to impound the
jurors' names, the First Circuit examined the Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968."3 The Act provides that the district judge may
keep jurors' names confidential "where the interests of justice so
require."54 In interpreting the section, the First Circuit did not give
deference to the trial judge in interpreting the "interests of justice"
standard.55 Instead, the court read the standard narrowly and
reiterated federal judicial policy that statutory interpretation should
avoid engendering constitutional issues if a reasonable alternative
exists.56 The court refused to draw a line between the First and Sixth
Amendments and found that there was a "reasonable alternative"-
the restriction of access only where "exceptional circumstances
peculiar to the case" exist.57 These exceptional circumstances were
articulated as "credible threat[s] to jury tampering, risk[s] of personal
harm to individual jurors, and other evils affecting the administration
of justice."58  The court of appeals ruled that mere personal
491 d. at 91.
so Id.
3' Globe, 920 F.2d at 91.
52 id.
5' 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (1994).
5Id.
55 See Globe, 920 F.2d at 93; see also Hall v. Bolger, 768 F.2d 1148, 1150 (9th Cir.
1985) (reiterating maxim of appellate review that any elements of legal analysis and
statutory interpretation which figure in a lower court's decision are reviewable de novo).
56 See Globe, 920 F.2d at 93 (citing Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989)).
5' See id. at 97.
5s Id.
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preferences of anonymity do not amount to exceptional
circumstances. 59 Thus, the Globe court's decision gave more power
to the press.6.
B. United States v. Doherty
6
In Dohery, the jurors unanimously requested anonymity after
a sixty-two day trial, including eight days of deliberation.62 The
press applied for immediate access to the venire list by seeking to
have an impoundment order vacated. 63 A paramount reason given by
the press was their desire to interview the jurors "while the public's
attention was still focused intently on the 'jury's performance of its
public duties. ""' The district court struck a compromise between the
competing interests of media access and expressed privacy interests
of jurors by staying the motion to lift the impoundment for seven
days.65 The district court did so to allow the jury to get their lives
66 Tecutraoein order aftersixty-two days of public service. The court reasoned
that the benefits promoted by press access were "no less advanced"
by waiting seven days before contacting jurors.67
The compromise implemented in Doherty is one of many that
have been suggested by the federal courts in an effort to balance the
competing interests in these situations. Other considerations include:
admonishing the jury not to discuss deliberations with the press,68
59 Id. at 98.
60 It has been argued that the Globe court gave more power to the press, while
completely overlooking jurors' privacy interests; that it only provided its "citizen
soldiers" with the "illusory shield" of refusing to grant press interviews. See John D.
Keenan, Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-First Circuit Overlooks Jurors'Privacy-Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Hurley, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 781 (1991).
61 675 F. Supp. 719 (D. Mass. 1987).
'a Id. at 721.
6 Id.
Id. (quoting Memorandum of Globe Newspaper Co. at 3).
Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 724-25.
6Id. at 725.
67 Id.
' See Public Disclosures, supra note 15, at 903 (stating that restricting the jurors'
right to speak to the press presents lesser constitutional problems than interfering with
the right of the press to publish jurors' remarks or interfering with the public's right to
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reminding the jury of their right not to speak with a member of the
media, the right of jurors to seek relief of the court if newspeople
continue to harass them69 and rushing the jury out of the courthouse
upon delivering the verdict.7"
C. In re Express-News Corp..
The Fifth Circuit has ruled on a local rule which prohibited
any person from interviewing any juror concerning his or her
deliberations or verdict, except upon leave of the court.72 The court
in In re Express-News Corp. found the law unconstitutional as
applied. 73 The publisher and a reporter of the San Antonio Express
filed a motion to vacate the restrictions on the press and were denied
leave by the trial court to interview the jurors.74  The Western
District of Texas' local court Rule 500-2 was at issue. It provided
that:
No . . . attorney or any party to an action or any
other . . . person shall himself or through any
investigator or other person acting for him interview,
examine or question any juror . . . either during the
pendency of the trial or with respect to the
deliberations or verdict of the jury in any action,
solicit such remarks).
' See United States v. Franklin, 546 F. Supp. 1133, 1145 (N.D. Ind. 1982) (stating
that the court would "deal appropriately with any behavior constituting harassment");
see also infra text accompanying notes 120-36.
70 See, e.g., Joanne Kenen, Smith Acquitted of All Charges in Pabn Beach Rape
Case, REUTERS, Dec. 11, 1991, at 1 (jurors "whisked out" of courthouse under police
guard after rendering verdict); Paul Richter, Jury Acquits Smith of Rape at Kennedy
Estate, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1991, at 1 (jury "slipped out" of courthouse without
comment).
"' 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982).
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except on leave of court granted upon good cause
shown.
7 6
The Fifth Circuit found that a court rule cannot restrict the
journalistic right to gather news unless it is "narrowly tailored to
prevent a substantial threat to the administration of justice. "77 Under
Express-News, a court may not impose the burden of showing good
cause upon those seeking access to juror names.7" Instead, the
burden is placed upon the government by requiring that it
demonstrate the need for curtailment.79 It should be noted that the
court in Express-News did not find Rule 500-2 unconstitutional on its
face." Instead, the court struck down the law because the
impoundment order was unlimited in scope and time, applied equally
to those jurors requesting privacy and those anxious to speak, and
foreclosed questions relating to jurors' general reactions."1
However, some disturbing dicta exists in the Express-News
opinion for advocates of jurors' privacy rights. First, the court
qualified its holding to requests for interviews proposed by the media
in this case82 where the requests were made "in connection with the
preparation of a news story." 3 The court decided that the news-
people were not seeking to inquire about the deliberative process and
were not seeking to obtain any evidence of improprieties." The court
stated that the inter view were sought for a "different purpose."85
76 W. D. Tex. R. 500-2.
77 Express-News, 695 F.2d at 810 (quoting United States v. CBS, Inc., 497 F.2d
102, 104 (5th Cir. 1974)).
'm Id. at 810.
79 id.
80 See id. at 811. The court expressed that it was unconstitutional only as applied
in that the "petitioners' right to gather news was restricted in the case without any
showing that the restriction was necessary." Id.
sI Id. at 810.
n See Express-News, 695 F.2d at 811.
83 Id. at 808.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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However, the court did not articulate what that purpose was.86
Also, the Express-News court said that the media were not seeking to
impeach any verdict.17 However, the court failed to recognize that
this danger exists when interviewing any juror.88  Even though the
media may only intend to inquire about a juror's general attitude
towards the judicial system or the jurors' general perceptions about
the trial, a juror might make a statement which is likely to impeach
the verdict.89 The court did not address what happens when such a
statement is circulated and how this affects the government's interest
in the finality of jury verdicts. 90
86 The court stated that it had denied requests for "post-verdict juror interviews
designed to obtain evidence of improprieties in the deliberations" and implied that it
would continue to do so in those situations. Id. at 810. The court indicated that the
petitioning parties in these cases were more concerned with obtaining information about
the jury's activities than they were with impeaching the verdict. Id.
8 Express-News, 695 F.2d at 810.
sIn the trial of John Hinckley, who was accused of attempting to assassinate U.S.
President Ronald Reagan, two jurors took the opportunity to tell a badgering press that
they had been persuaded to agree with the verdict. Beach, supra note 30, at 42. See
Public Disclosures, supra note 15; Aaron, supra note 28, at 203.
'9 Statements which serve to undermine the integrity of the verdict cut against the
"system's strong interest in finality." Public Disclosures, supra note 15, at 89 ("[1]f the
business of the world is to go on, the system must produce results that are, as far as
possible, free from doubt and internal contradiction."). Id.
0 This interest is reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) which provides in
part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . . a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon his or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to assent to or
dissent from the verdict . . . or concerning his mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought
to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was
improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
FED. R. EVID. 606(b). Notably, the original form of the rule contained no exceptions
which prohibited jurors from testifying about their deliberations. Christopher B.
Mueller, Jurors' Impeachment of Verdicts and Indictments in Federal Court under Rule
606(b), 57 NEB. L. REV. 920, 928 (1978). Rule 606(b) is an outgrowth of the common
law maxim that "a juror may not impeach his own verdict." Id. (citing Vaise v.
Delaval, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785)). The rule is based on four basic principles:
(1) prevention of juror harassment; (2) prevention of public scrutiny over what is
intended to be a private deliberation process; (3) prevention of the undermining of the
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D. United States v. Harrelson9'
Harrelson involved the conviction of three defendants for
various acts and conspiracies surrounding the murder of a United
States District Judge. 92  In contrast to Express-News Corp., a
different panel of the Fifth Circuit upheld local Rule 500-2."3 The
trial judge placed restrictions on the media's post-verdict questioning
of jurors, preventing repeated requests for juror interviews and
denying any inquiry into the specific votes of other jurors during their
interviews.' The El Paso Times relied on the Express-News decision
and contended that reporters be "permitted to interview the
discharged jurors without restriction of any sort whatsoever."95 The
court ruled the jurors "were fair game until [they] express .
[their] desire not to be interviewed in such a manner that the would-
be interviewer knows of that desire." 96 The court noted that once a
juror has decided against an interview, it is unlikely that he will
change his mind97 and if he does, he may always initiate the
interview.98
finality of the verdict; and (4) prevention of the tampering with the process that would
be difficult to protect. Id. at 923-24. The last of these reasons is illustrated by the
potential juror who "reluctantly joined in a verdict" and may be "sympathetic" towards
the defeated party and "to be persuadable to the view that his own consent rested upon
false or impermissible considerations." Id. at 924.
The government's interest in the finality of the verdict is reflected in Tanner
v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987). In Tanner, the Court held that testimony from
a juror regarding drug and alcohol use by jurors during trial was properly barred by
Rule 606(b) because such actions do not qualify as "outside influences" under the rule.
Id. at 125. The Court did sympathize with the defendant's contention: "There is little
doubt that postverdict investigation into juror misconduct would in some instances lead
to the invalidation of verdicts reached after irresponsible or improper juror behavior.
It is not at all clear, however, that the jury system could survive suchefforts to perfect
it." Id. at 120.
9' 713 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1041 (1984).




' Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1118.
9 id.
98 Id.
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The court distinguished Express-News, stating that the
decision dealt with the rule's application in that case, an unrelated
criminal matter.99  The court found the implemented restrictions
permissible and denied mandamus.1"' First, the Harrelson court
found the ban on repeated requests for interviews not to be an abuse
of discretion by the trial judge. 1 ' Citing Express-News, the Fifth
Circuit noted that "jurors, even after completing their duty, are
entitled to privacy and to protection against harassment."t0 2 Second,
in addressing the ban on questions relating to other jurors' votes, the
court applied United States v. Gurney."3 Gurney held that "the
press, in common with all others, are free to report whatever takes
place in open court but enjoy no special First Amendment right of
access to matters not available to the public at large."" Because
jury deliberations fall within matters not available to the public at
large,' O5 the court held the trial judge's restriction not to be an abuse
of discretion. 106
E. United States v. Sherman'
In Sherman, the defendants were tried for a series of
bombings and bank robberies in connection with their mission, as
part of a revolutionary group, to overthrow the governments of the
United States and the State of Washington.'08 At least one occasion
of juror tampering occurred during the trial: one of the defendants
had written to jurors at their homes, urging them to ignore the
99 Id. at 1115 (emphasis added).
'0 Id. at 1114, 1115.
'10 Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1115.
"o Id. at 1118 (citing Express-News, 695 F.2d at 810).
'o 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977).
IoJ Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1118.
'o See, e.g., Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954), appeal after
remand, 348 U.S. 904 (1955); United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1975);
Downey v. Peyton, 451 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1971); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(c)
(stating that grand jury deliberations are to remain secret).
106 Gurney, 558 F.2d at 1210-11.
'w 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978).
Io d. at 1359.
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judge's instructions."0 9 At the close of trial, the judge issued an oral
order "forb[idding] the jurors from discussing the case with anyone,
[telling them] that they would be protected from further harassment,
and... order[ing] everyone, including the news media, to stay away
from the jurors. "110
Upon mandamus review, the Court of Appeals concluded that
because the trial was over, "there was no possibility that allowing the
jurors to speak to newsmen would deprive [the defendants] of a fair
trial.""1 In analyzing the trial court's justifications for imposing the
order, namely to enable jurors to serve on future jury panels and to
protect the jurors from harassment, the court found that less
restrictive alternatives were "easily available."1
1 2
In addressing the issue of the jurors' ability to serve on future
jury panels, the court noted that any biases created as a result of
media attention could be discovered upon future voir dire."'
Alternatively, the court could always excuse these jurors from any
future service." 4 Weighing the competing interests, the court found
that the inability to serve on future juries is neither sufficiently
serious nor a threat sufficiently imminent to justify the blanket
restraint upon media contact with jurors." 5
Nor was the court persuaded by the harassment argument put
forth by the trial court." 6 Because the possibility existed that not all
jurors would view interview requests as harassment, such a
prospective ban would not be acceptable." 7 The court: emphasized
that steps be taken against harassment remedially, not
preventatively. "8 The court also stressed that its opinion should not
109 See id.
0Id. at 1360.
m See id. at 1361.




116 See id. at 1361.
1.7 Sherman, 581 F.2d at 1361.
118 See id.
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be construed as requiring jurors to speak to anyone, including the
media. 1 9
F. United States v. Franklin12
In United States v. Franklin, the defendant attempted to shoot
a prominent civil rights activist and was charged with violating the
victim's civil, rights.12 1 The trial involved "a number of unique
security problems to the court, its personnel, witnesses, and the
defendant himself. "1'22 In dismissing alternate jurors, the trial judge
made the following remarks:
[T]he most important thing I want to say to you. is
that I now enjoin all participants in this trial, and all
others, as I always do, from attempting to interrogate
any of the four of you. And the same injunction will
be applicable to the 12 jurors when they return ....
I understand that there are those of you who disagree
with this almost violently. But as long as I have
anything to do with running trials it will be so. And
that is I do not think and never have, that jurors
should be subject to anybody questioning them when
they leave the performance of their duties. They
can't question me; I'm a Judge. You're also judges,
and they can't question you. And I do not permit
it. 123
Upon releasing the jurors after rendering a verdict of not guilty, the
court told them:
I1 d. at 1362.
"2 546 F. Supp. 1133 (N.D. Ind. 1982).
id. at 1134.
SId. The court did not articulate these "unique security problems," but did mention
jurors' right to privacy: "It is very possible for one juror to engage in post-trial violation
of the privacy of another." Id. at 1142.
'23 id. at 1135.
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It is the normal practice of this Court to enjoin those
who are participants in this trial, all others, from
attempting to interrogate you about the contents of
your deliberations or the reasons for your
verdict . . . . There are reasons for that. Simply
stated, you will be called back for other cases. There
are other good policy reasons, in my opinion, and in
the opinions of judges through the Federal System in
reported cases, for that injunction.
1 1
4
When members of the news media applied for mandamus
review to the Seventh Circuit, the court modified its oral order
prohibiting contact between the press and jury. 25 Judge Sharp
emphasized that "[it] is fundamental and beyond dispute that the
deliberations of a jury are private and confidential and, except in a
very narrow range of circumstances, the court itself is inhibited from
inquiring into the contents of such deliberations."' 26 The court also
recognized the danger of one juror violating the privacy of another
juror by discussing the other's thoughts and reasons for arriving at
his verdict.127 The court analogized jury deliberations to the private
conferences of the Supreme Court and the private communications
between its justices, law clerks, and other court personnel.1
2
"[T]hese courts and judges speak through their official records," the
court noted, "and are not obligated to grant press interviews. " 129
Similarly, Judge Sharp argued, jurors are not obligated.'
Judge Sharp defended his order by saying that he never
intended to "inhibit the jurors' right, post-trial and away from the
courthouse, to initiate or volunteer statements regarding the trial to
the press or to the public."' In addressing the argument that the
124 d. at 1136.
" Franklin, 546 F. Supp. at 1145.
12 6d. at 1142.
127 See id.
'2' See id. at 1143.
129 id.
' Franklin, 546 F. Supp..at 1144. The Court was concerned with protecting the
jurors from harassment and undue influence. Id.
131 Id.
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judiciary should be no less subject to public scrutiny than any other
branch of government;: and that the judicial process should be open
to the public, the court distinguished the judiciary from the other
branches' of government and recognized the historically private
process of the court.13 The court wrote that "[t]o compare a jury to
a legislative council or administrative agency is to totally misconstrue
its basic nature. "133
Recognizing Sherman'34 as persuasive authority, the court
modified the order to preclude jury interviews on the premises of the
courthouse, to enjoin counsel and parties from interviewing jurors
after the verdict, and to declare that it is the jurors' exclusive private
decision whether they will grant interviews. The order included a
warning that the court would deal appropriately with any behavior
constituting harassment. 
13 6
G. Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem1
31
The Journal Publishing case involved alleged civil rights
violations by members of the police force and the City of
Albuquerque, New Mexico. 33 At the close of the case, the trial
judge admonished the jurors not to discuss their verdict:
You should not discuss your verdict after you leave
here with anyone. If anyone tries to talk to you about
it or wants to talk to you about it, let me know. If
they wish [to] take the matter up with me, why, they





t United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978).
'"Franklin, 546 F. Supp. at 1144-45.
136 ld.
137 801 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1986).
'm Id. at 1235.
139 Id.
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In refusing an informal request to modify his order, the judge
explained that he admonished the jury to remain silent only in civil
actions.140 In its petition for a writ of mandamus, the petitioner
contended that the order deprived it of its First Amendment right to
gather news, denied the public the. opportunity to know the basis of
the jury's verdict, and deprived the jurors of their First Amendment
rights. 141
The Tenth Circuit ordered the trial. court to dissolve its
order. 4 ' The court first distinguished the media from counsel in the
post-verdict setting.'43 It noted that the media has less incentive to
upset a verdict than does a losing party or attorney." 4 Thus, a court
does not have the same broad discretion to regulate media contact
with the dismissed jury. 4 ' The court stated that "any inhibitions
against news coverage, of a trial carry a heavy presumption of an
unconstitutional prior restraint."146 Invoking Express-News'47 and
Sherman,14 1 the court reiterated that "the court must narrowly tailor
any prior restraint and must consider any reasonable alternatives to
that restraint which have a lesser impact on First Amendment
rights." 49 Because the order had no time or scope limitations and
encompassed every possible interview situation, it was declared a
"sweeping restraint" and thus unconstitutional."'0 The court looked
to Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court' and could not find the
necessary "compelling government interest." 5 2
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Journal Publishing, 801 F.2d at 1237. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that the
court's order was overbroad. Id.
143 Id. at 1236.
'" See id.
'4' See id.
' Id. (citing United States v. Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358, 1361 (9th Cir. 1978)).
"4 In re Express-News Corp., 695 F.2d 807 (5th Cir. 1982).
'4 Sherman, 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978).
"4 Journal Publishing, 801 F.2d at 1236.
"o Id. at 1237.
3 457 U.S. 596, 606-07 (1982) (attempts to deny right of access in order to inhibit
disclosure of sensitive information must be necessitated by a compelling government
interest narrowly tailored to serve that interest).
'52 Journal Publishing, 801 F.2d at 1237.
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IV. Decisions in the States
A. State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Hamilton County Court of
Common Pleas'53
In Cincinnati Post, the trial judge asked the jury if they
wished to talk to counsel or the press after the verdict, 54  The
foreman answered, "We don't want to talk."155 The judge then
issued the following order:
No one is to talk to the jurors about the case and the
jurors aren't to talk to anybody about it. They just
don't want to talk about it. And I'm going to respect
their decision by making it the order of the Court that
nobody talks to the jurors. 156
A writ of prohibition was allowed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. 57
The court found that "while a more narrowly focused order might
have been constitutional, this one violates the First Amendment.""5 8
Respondent first argued that the order only enforced the
existing desire of the jury not to speak to the press. 15 9 This argument
was rejected for two reasons. First, the court found that the
foreman's statement did not necessarily speak for the whole jury and
could have only spoken for a majority or a consensus.16 Second, the
order failed to allow for a situation where jurors change their minds
about speaking to the press.16' The court showed approval of less
restrictive measures, such as those in Sherman
162 and Harrelson.163
'5 570 N.E.2d 1101 (Ohio 1991).




57 Id. at. 1105.
1" Cincinnati Post, 570 N.E.2d at 1102.
"9 Id. at 1103.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 581 F.2d 1358 (9th Cir. 1978).
'" 713 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1983).
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Respondent's second argument, that "the jury system and its
deliberations depend upon confidentiality," was also rejected.'
Noting that courts have upheld, orders restricting jurors from
discussing another juror's specific vote,165 the court found that the
order here also precluded a juror from discussing her vote and found
the order to. be :a "categorical denial of all access and
unconstitutional.'166 Further, the court rejected any analogy to post-
trial access to the jury of parties or counsel, finding that non-parties
"have less incentive to upset a verdict than does a losing party or
attorney. "
167
B. Newsday v. Sise 1
68
Newsday v. Sise stands in stark contrast to the, opinions of the
federal courts. In Newsday, a paper sought access under the New
York Freedom of Information Law 69 (FOIL) to the names and
addresses of the jurors after a mistrial was granted in a highly
publicized murder trial. 7' In a unanimous decision, the Court of
Appeals of the State of New York denied access to juror
questionnaires which contained their names and addresses as well as
personal family information. 71  At issue was New York Judiciary
Law § 509(a), which provides:-
The commissioner of jurors shall determine the
qualifications of a prospective juror on the basis of
'6 Cincinnati Post, 570 N.E.2d at 1103-04. The Respondent's'argument was based
upon the idea that the jurors' free thought may be stifled if their ballots were to be
published; See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
"o Id. at 1104 (citing United States v. Harrelson, 713 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir.
1983)).
Id. (quoting Express-News, 695 F.2d at 811).
167 Id. (quoting Journal Publishing, 801 F.2d at 1236).
'"518 N.E.2d 930 (N.Y. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988).
169 N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 84 (McKinney 1993). The enactment of the "FOIL" law
reflected the legislature's desire to extend public accountability by giving the public
unimpaired access to government records, unless those records were prepared solely for
litigation.
170 Newsday, 518 N.E.2d at 931.
7 Id. at 933.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
information provided on the juror's qualification
questionnaire . . . . Such questionnaires and records
shall be considered confidential and shall not be
disclosed except to the county jury board or as
permitted by the appellate division.172
Newsday did not seek the questionnaires for itself, but instead argued
that it was entitled under FOIL to information contained in other
records derived from or containing the information included in the
questionnaires. 173 The court discussed the legislative history of the
section and recognized that disclosure could result in harassment of
jurors, attempts at retribution, or intimidation.74
The Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's argument that it
was entitled under FOIL to the information contained in other records
but derived from the questionnaires. 175 "While [the law] . . . refers
only to the juror qualification questionnaires, its obvious purpose is
to provide a cloak of confidentiality for the information which the
questionnaires contain." 1 76 Further, the court rejected the argument
that because the jurors' names were revealed in open court, their
privacy rights would not be further trespassed upon by having a list
of their names revealed. 177 The court held that because the law in
question expressly prohibits the disclosure of names, the mere fact
that the names were mentioned publicly does not compel disclosure
under the statute.1 78 Finally, in a footnote, the court rejected the
assertion that the constitutional right of access to criminal proceedings
and the common law right of access to judicial records compelled
disclosure. 79  It held that because no access to proceedings or
transcripts thereof was claimed, and because the information sought
172 N.Y. JUD. LAW § 509(a) (McKinney 1992).
'73 Newsday, 518 N.E.2d at 932.
174 Id. at 932.
'7I d. at 933.
176 Id. at 932.
'77 id. at 933.
17' Newsday, 518 N.E.2d at 933.
'79 Id. at 933 n.4.
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had not been entered into evidence or filed with the court, the
constitutional right of access had not been violated."' S
As the preceding cases illustrate, there is confusion as to what
measures a trial judge may permissibly take in attempting to protect
a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and a juror's right
to privacy.181 While absolute bans on juror contact may be allowed
in exceptional circumstances, 18 2 the scope of a judge's authority in
balancing the rights involved in the post-verdict setting is in doubt in
light of Newsday v. Sise and the Supreme Court's refusal to address
the issue directly.183 What follows are several additional concerns
involved in such situations and some possible reconciliations.
V. "Checkbook Journalism"
One major-concern over public disclosure of jury deliberations
is the prevention of what has been called "checkbook journalism." 84
In some highly publicized cases, jurors have sold their stories about
their experiences to the press, sometimes for substantial monetary
gain.185 For example, in the Bernard Goetz case,18 6 two jurors were
180 Id.
'8' See generally supra notes 41-181 and accompanying text (discussing the Globe,
Express-News, Harrelson, Sherman, Franklin, Journal Publishing, Cincinnati Post and
Newsday cases).
"8 The First Circuit articulated exceptional circumstances as "[plersonal safety of
the jurors, special risk of personal harm to the jurors, failure of the court to shield jurors
from threatened harm [which] could severely damage the functioning of the courts and
the jury system." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Hurley, 920 F.2d 88, 91 (1st Cir. 1990).
83 See supra notes 41-181 and accompanying text.
Kenneth Jost, The Dawn of Big Bucks Juror Journalism, LEOAL TIMEs, July 20,
1987, at 15.
185 See id.
' Bernard Goetz (whose case sparked considerable debate over the subjects of gun
control, race, and vigilantism) was convicted in 1989 for carrying an unlicensed pistol
during an incident on a New York City subway where he shot four youths who allegedly
asked him for five dollars. See, e.g., Carole Agus, Wolf or Wimp? Myths and Realities
of Bernhard Goetz, Subway Vigilante, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 14, 1986, at Cl; Bob Drogin,
Murder Count Rejected in N.Y. 'Vigilante' Case; Goetz Indicted on Illegal Gun Charges,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1985, at 1; Barbara Goldberg, Goetz Gets One Year in Jail for
Having Illegal Gun-NYC Shooter Maintains Innocence, DETRorr FREE PRESS, Jan. 14,
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
paid $2,500 and nearly $5,000 respectively for their stories.t 7 One
was a three-part series based on a tape-recorded diary made during
the juror's service in the trial."8 ' Another such example is the famous
Pennzoil-Texaco case which resulted in the largest award ever by a
jury-$10 billion."8 9 One juror wrote a book defending the award
and received an advance from his publisher of at least $10,000.19'
Concern over this sort of behavior is not without reason. The
major problem affecting Sixth Amendment rights is the concern that
a juror could intentionally hide any biases to be on a jury, thereby
preserving her opportunity for a profit.1 9  Perhaps even more
dangerous is the potential for a juror to create a verdict that would
make a "good ending" to the story.1 92
It has been argued that highly publicized trials make it
especially difficult to empanel an impartial jury.193 The defendant
may already have been convicted in the press, 94 or potential jurors
may be fearful of rendering a particular verdict because they feel
their safety is threatened, 195 or that their verdict will cause public
outcry.' 96 It is unnecessary to compound these pre-existing problems
1989, at IA.
187 Jost, supra note 184, at 15.
I" Id.; see Howard Kurtz, What a Trial! More Than You Wanted to Know about
the Goetz Case, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1988, at C6 (discussing Goetz juror Mark
Lesley's co-written account (with journalist Charles Shuttleworth) of his experience
during the trial).
189 Jost, supra note 184, at 15.
190 See id.
'9' Id.; see Marcy Strauss, Juror Journalism, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 389, 395-




I93 See Kastin, supra note 36, at 110 (arguing that "the explosion of communications
in the electronic age . . diminishes the possibility of selecting [an impartial jury]").
194 See id.
195 See, e.g., United States v. Pasciuti, 803 F. Supp. 499 (D.N.H. 1992) (holding
that the potential for intimidation and harassment of jurors merits preventative action).
"z See, e.g., Bill Rankin, The Curtis Power *Trial Q & A on the News, ATLA
J. & CONST., Mar. 9, 1995, at B3 ("The public has shown outrage repeatedly in recent
years after surprising jury decisions in high profile cases.").
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with the possibility of a juror seeking to become empaneled in an
effort to sell her story for financial gain. 
197
Proponents of First Amendment rights argue that publishing
jurors' stories is part of a healthy democratic society which serves
many crucial functions. 9 ' Others have called for legislation to
prohibit ju'ors from selling their stories to the press. 199 For example,
Barry Slotnick, the attorney who defended Bernhard Goetz, had been
in favor of the post-verdict interview. 2" However, when he heard
about, the bounties paid for the juror stories in his client's case, he
called for legislation, along the lines of the "Son of Sam" laws,
which prohibit criminals from collecting profits connected with the
publishing of stories about their crimes, to be applied to jurors in
cases such as his client's.
2 0 1
VI. The Media and Jury Deliberations
The specific concern over checkbook journalism is related to
the general concern with public discussion of the deliberative
process.20 2 It has long been taken for granted that the jury is to
conduct its deliberations in private. 2 3 The purpose of having a jury
deliberate in secret is to encourage "free debate, without which the
decision making process would be crippled. ,,2o A thorough exchange
197 See Jost, supra note 184, at 15.
19 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
'"See generally Recent Legislation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (1995) (discussing the
constitutional propriety of recently enacted legislation designed to prevent checkbook
journalism); Strauss, supra note 191 (arguing thatlegislation that would prohibit jurors
from talking about their experiences violates basic First Amendment rights).
00 Jost, supra note 184, at 15.
201 Id.
See generally Sharp, supra note 24, at 6 ("Were jury deliberations to be open to
anyone, a strong likelihood exists that even the mere presence of observers would inhibit
unfairly the deliberation process.").
203 Public Disclosures,' supra note 15, at 886.
2o4 Id. at 889-90.
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of ideas and impressions among the jury is crucial25 and any
restriction on this free debate is undesirable as it may serve to
increase concern over the integrity of the verdict. 2 6 For example, in
Clark v. United States,"7 Justice Cardozo wrote that "[f]reedom of
debate might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors
were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be freely
published to the world."
208
It has been argued that public disclosure of deliberations
serves to undermine the jury process itself.20 9 It is not enough that
justice is served-there must also be the appearance that justice is
being served through some fair and impartial process. 2t0  For
example, exposing verdicts to "easy and obvious criticism" 211 chips
away at the respect that jury verdicts should be afforded.2"2 While
faith in the jury system must be "blind, but purposefully and not
irrationally so, ''211 it must be blind nonetheless.
This blindness means that the media should not subject the
jury to second guesses. 1 The trial court, which has discretion to set
20S See id. ("For the process to work according to theory, the participants must feel
completely free to dissect the credibility, motivations, and just desserts of other
people.").
20 Id. at 891. For a full discussion of restrictions on jurors see FED. R. EViD.
606(b), supra note 90.
207 289 U.S. 1 (1933).
208 Id. at 13.
208 Public Disclosures, supra note 15,'at 904.
210 See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 342 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(destroying the appearance of justice casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process);
Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance
of justice."); see also Walker v. Lockhart, 726 F.2d 1238, 1249 (8th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 958, (1984) cert. dismissed, 468 U.S. 1222 (1984) (Arnold, J.,
concurring) ("If due process means anything, it means a trial before an unbiased judge
and jury.").
2.. Public Disclosures, supra note 15, at 891.
2' See Sharp, supra note 24, at 14 n.44 (discussing the "cardinal rule" of appellate
review that a jury's verdict will be taken as conclusive and is therefore not subject to
review absent a showing that the verdict is clearly erroneous).
213 Public Disclosures, supra note 15, at 892.
214 See Sharp, supra note 24, at 14 n.44 (verdict taken as conclusive absent "clearly
erroneous" showing).
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aside a verdict," 5 bears much of this responsibility. Also, there are
other mechanisms designed to afford the defendant his Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial. First, there are rules of evidence,
either codified or under common law of the jurisdiction, which serve
to filter out prejudicial evidence while admitting relevant, non-
prejudicial evidence.21 6 Second, all procedures taken to ensure an
impartial jury should be made prior to trial.2" 7 This can be
accomplished through sequestration and through voir dire where any
potential biases can be exposed. 218 . It is simply not in the domain of
the media to second guess the jury.'s verdict and "subject Uurors] to
easy and obvious criticism."219 Simply put, once counsel chooses a
jury and the trial is conducted employing the rules of evidence, the
verdict must be accepted and not second-guessed by anyone except
the trial judge who may have the power to set aside a verdict. 22° Too
21s See FED. R. Civ'. P. 50(b).
216 See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 401 ("Relevant evidence means evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact . . . of consequence . . . more or less
probable .... ); FED. R. EviD. 403 (providing that "evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice").
217 In the interests of fairness and judicial economy, this makes the most sense. For
example, voir dire and sequestration are addressed before trial. So should this measure
of helping to ensure a fair trial.
218 See, e.g., Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (voirdire examination serves
the purpose of enabling the court to select an impartial jury).
219 Public Disclosures, supra note 15, at 891; see Sharp, supra note 24, at 14 ("Once
the verdict has been returned . . . the court has the additional duty to protect [the]
verdict from attack.").
o See Public Disclosures, supra note 15, at 897 (interest in finality); Sharp, supra
note 24, at 14 n.44 (jury's verdict considered conclusive absent a showing of clear
error); FED. R. CIv. P. 50(b) (court may direct entry of judgment after verdict as a
matter of law). See also United States v. Gravely, 840 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1988). In
Gravely, the defendant sought to have a guilty verdict overturned because of, inter alia,
jurors' statements to the media that the verdicts were rendered because of
"technicalities" and that the jurors "were under extreme pressure at the end of a two-
week trial." Id. at 1159. It was contended that another juror stated that there was some
expressed sentiment that defendant was innocent but that those jurors changed their views
because of "time pressure." Id. One juror allegedly told the media that defendant
would have been found innocent had deliberations continued. Id. The Fourth Circuit
held that a request to interview the jurors was properly denied because no threshold
showing of improper outside influence was shown. Id. (citing Big John, B.V. v. Indian
Head Grain Co., 718 F.2d 143, 150 (5th Cir. 1983); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S.
107 (1987) (holding that allegations of juror misconduct which were raised post-verdict
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs.
often in controversial trials, groups with various affiliations and
agendas attend the trial and critique the verdict. 221  This sort of
behavior is undesirable and, in fact, is subject to legislative regulation
even though First Amendment rights are implicated.222
Notably, Great Britain has dealt with the problem of the
media inquiring into the deliberative process by passing the Contempt
of Court Act in 1981.223 The law makes it illegal for reporters and
researchers to question jurors about their deliberations.224 It also
makes it illegal for jurors to discuss their deliberations with anyone
and imposes a maximum jail sentence of two years and a fine with no
set maximum.225 While not likely to be enforced against jurors (the
Attorney General must pre-approve any such prosecution),226 no such
pre-approval is necessary for prosecuting members of the media.227
VII. Possible Reconciliations
In light of the conflicts that exist in highly-publicized cases,
a need becomes apparent for a method of balancing the interests
wherein jurors' privacy rights and defendants' Sixth Amendment
seriously disrupted'the finality of the jury process).
", One such example is a highly publicized rape case which occurred in Glen Ridge,
New Jersey. Over 100 people marched at the courthouse in protest over the handling
of the case and a protest was directed at New Jersey Chief Justice Robert N. Wilentz.
Women's groups were "poised to protest" if the defendants were acquitted. Robert
Hanley, Revocation of Bail Sought in Glen Ridge Abuse Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
1993, at A24; Catherine S. Manegold, A Rape Case Worries Advocates for the Retarded,
N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 1993, § 4, at 3.
m See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 564 (1965), reh'g denied, 380 U.S. 926
(holding that a statute which bars picketing or parading in or near a court is not
unconstitutional on its face). The court further declared that "judges are human, and the
legislature has the right to recognize the danger that some judges, jurors and other court
officials, will be consciously or unconsciously influenced by demonstrations in or near
their courtrooms both prior to and at- the time at trial." Id. at 565.
n3 A British Law Bars Press from Violating Jury Room Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
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rights are given more weight.228 It is clear from the federal case law
discussed herein that absolute bans on the post-trial release of juror
lists are prohibited (absent exceptional circumstances), even at the
jurors' request.229
In a Globe-type situation, where the jurors request anonymity,
the First Amendment argument is that the court is not denying
anything to the press besides that which the jurors would deny them;
in effect, the court is saving the media the trouble.23' This argument
has been deemed to be without merit.2 3 ' Even if the jurors do not
wish to speak, the public is still entitled to know who the jurors
are. 232 This is necessary to verify their impartiality, ensure fairness,
the appearance of fairness, and public confidence in the system.233
Another major argument against withholding juror identities
is that the Sixth Amendment implications are muted after the
rendering of the verdict.234 However, this argument fails to give
enough credit to the concern of jurors who may be reluctant to speak
their minds during deliberations.235  A law similar to the British
Contempt of Court Act236 would be desirable, rendering illegal the
discussion of another juror's deliberative process or specific vote.
237
This does not seem radical, especially in light of Gurney238 and
2 See, e.g., Tsokalas v. Purtill, 756 F. Supp. 89, 93-95 (D. Conn. 1991); Keenan,
supra note 60; Kelly Knivila, Seventeenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals 1986-1987." Right to Jury Trial, 76 GEO.
L. J. 946, 962 n.2173 (1988); Litt, supra note 16.
' See, e.g., Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem, supra notes 137-52 and
accompanying text.
230 See State ex rel. Cincinnati Post v. Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas,
570 N.E.2d 1101, 1103 (Ohio 1991) (respondents arguing that restriction to juror access
only enforces an expressed desire not to talk to the press).
231 See id.
232 See Press Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 509 (1984).
233 See Globe, 920 F.2d at94; see also Public Disclosures, supra note 15 at 886;
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
23' Globe, 920 F.2d at 97 n.9. Cf. Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 724 (opining that
defendant's rights at this point are still "vitally implicated"); Sherman, 581 F.2d at 1361.
See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 13 (1933).
See British Law, supra note 223, at D15.
" Id.; see Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1118 (upholding ban on inquiry into specific votes
of other jurors).
' United States v; Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977).
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Harrelson.3 The trial judge could explicitly instruct the jurors
before the trial or before they retire to deliberate (or at both
junctures) that their deliberations are theirs and theirs alone, and that
their opinions and votes will not be made public; that they are to
deliberate as a body and deliver a verdict as such.240 The right to
privacy necessitates more serious consideration because of Sixth
Amendment implications.
Issuing such an assurance would work well when combined
with the sort of judicial admonition used in Doherty,241 where the
judge "counseled" but could not order that discharged jurors refrain
from discussing their verdict with anyone.242 A law similar to the
Contempt of Court Act243 would allow for such an order, at least
toward the prevention of revealing another juror's vote. 2" The judge
has considerable influence over the jury in the trial process and in
most cases, jurors obey the instructions of the court.2 " Therefore,
it is appropriate for the judge to use his influence in requesting that
jurors refrain from discussing their verdicts. Indeed, this may be all
that is permissible under the case law.
The waiting period implemented in Doherty is also appealing
in those highly publicized trials where the jury is particularly subject
to harassment.246 If a case is so highly charged that the press feels
a special need to gain access to the jurors, then it surely can wait a
239 Harrelson, 713 F.2d at 1114.
240 A jury instruction similar to the post-trial Globe charge would be appropriate in
this situation. See Globe, 920 F.2d at 90 ("lilt is best that the result of your
deliberations should remain in confidence.").
241 See Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 724.
242 Id.
243 See British Law, supra note 223 and accompanying text.
24 Id.
245 See Robert L. Raskopf, A First Amendment Right ofAccess to a Juror's Identity:
Toward a Fuller Understanding of the Jury's Deliberative Process, 17 PEPP. L. REv.
357 (1990) (arguing that judicial admonitions to departing jurors not to discuss specific
votes or positions of others have been "largely successful"); Rita J. Simon, Does the
Court's Decision in Nebraska Press Association Fit the Research Evidence on the Impact
on Jurors of News Coverage?, 29 STAN. L. REV. 515, 523 (1977) (arguing that results
of a study showed that jurors take judicial admonitions seriously).
246 The Hinckley case, supra note 28, again provides an example. The heavy and
noisome coverage was so bad that at one point, several jurors temporarily moved out of
their homes. Beach, supra note 30, at 42; see Aaron, supra note 28 at 206.
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week before having the chance for the interview.247 The reasons for
allowing press access are "no less advanced" by the wait. 48 The
public still gets to see that the verdict was rendered by twelve
members of the community and impartiality will not appear to be
compromised after seven days. 249 Also, the "community therapeutic
value" 2 0 is the same.
Along with the proposed law that discharged jurors should not
discuss their fellow jurors' votes or the reasons for arriving at a
particular verdict, and in addition to the proposed admonitions,
judges should implement any or all of the procedures discussed in the
cases. When reminding the jury of the law, the judge should remind
the jury of their right not to speak, their right to contact the court
should any media personnel harass them, and the reasons why it is
undesirable to betray the secrecy of the jury room.25 1  The
combination of all of these factors may help to ensure the Sixth
Amendment right to a fair' trial and may also help the jurors receive
as much from their jury service as they contribute.
VIII. Conclusion
It is recognized that an open trial process is historically and
constitutionally mandated. However, it is not entirely clear under the
case law what aspects of the jury process are open to the media as the
Supreme Court has never directly addressed these conflicts in a post-
verdict setting. It is apparent that, absent a compelling interest,
absolute bans on post-verdict-juror name release and juror contact are
prohibited. However, in balancing the interests, more weight should
be given to the integrity and finality of the verdict, the privacy rights
,of jurors, and the defendant's right to a fair trial. While the trial
judge should be given broad discretion to implement a waiting period
or strongly admonish the jury not to discuss their verdict, legislatures
at both the federal and state levels should consider a law which would
247 Doherty, 675 F. Supp. at 725.
248 Id.
249 See id. at 725.
250 See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 570.
' See, e.g., Sharp, supra note 24, at 6.
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also prevent any juror from discussing the specific vote of one of his
fellow jurors or from discussing another juror's logic in deliberation.
The combination of the above may help strike the proper balance
between these competing interests.
Judge Politan eventually released the names of the jurors in
the Antar case but in so doing, used his discretion to impose narrowly
tailored restrictions upon the questions permitted to be asked of the
jurors.252 The court directed that no person was to inquire into "the
specific vote, statement, opinion, thoughts, or other comments of any
juror during deliberations other than the juror being interviewed."
211
The court also sent a letter to each juror advising them that they have
no obligation to speak to the press, but that they were free to do so
should they choose.254 Judge Politan further reminded the jury of the
historical secrecy of deliberations, calling it a "hallmark of the jury
system" 255 and suggested to them that they "respect the privacy of the
jury room. ,256 The court remained skeptical of the First Amendment
arguments presented by the press:
It is naive to blindly acknowledge or adopt the
unfettered First Amendment freedoms espoused by the
press to support its assertion of a right to invade the
secret deliberations of the jury room. The fact is, and
courts should candidly recognize it, that the invasion
of the jury system by the press is only, and I repeat
only, designed to sell newspapers.257
Certainly jurors are "citizen soldiers"258and "may be called
upon to perform distasteful tasks." 2 9  It must be remembered,
though, that real people pay a price and have to live with the
consequences of their service. Justice demands that these soldiers be
2 United States v. Antar, 839 F. Supp. 293, 305 (D.N.J. 1993).
25S3 id.
2 Id. at 308.
25 Id.
2 id.
' Antar, 839 F. Supp. at 297.
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given the support that they deserve from the government that is
sending them into battle.
Copernicus T. Gaza

